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Rethinking civil society and transitional justice: lessons from
social movements and ‘new’ civil society
Paul Gready and Simon Robins
Centre for Applied Human Rights, University of York, York, UK
ABSTRACT
Transitional justice has often reduced conceptions of civil society to
human rights NGOs, and lacks a rigorous conceptualisation of the
role that civil society plays in transitional justice processes. It
largely ignores as political actors the social movements that have
driven democratisation in various parts of the world and can be
credited as integral to the creation of the discourse of transitional
justice. While transitional justice in theory and practice remains
focused on traditional civil society, institutions and the state,
recent transitions highlight that change is driven by a range of
different actors, often using modes of organisation and repertoires
of action linked to social movement modalities and other forms of
collective action. As such we coin the term ‘new’ civil society,
associated with events such as the Arab Spring and austerity-led
protests in Southern Europe, to argue that it provides new models
for understanding change and justice in transition. An effort is
made to conceptualise the roles civil society can play in shaping
transitional justice and the ‘new’ civil society framework is used to
understand how such actors actively contest mainstream social,
political and transitional paradigms, and model alternatives to
them. ‘New’ civil society actors rethink how justice and rights are
understood in transition, and model alternatives that constitute
new forms of transitional politics.
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Introduction
The central contention of this article is that the field of transitional justice lacks a compre-
hensive and rigorous conceptualisation of the role that civil society plays in transitional
justice processes. Related fields, such as democratisation theory and development,
contain far more sophisticated scholarship on civil society.1 In part this weakness is
because transitional justice is in general under-theorised, but it is also informed by the
way in which transitional justice is defined – the mainstream definition of transitional
justice has four pillars: criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations and insti-
tutional reform. The focus on institutions, top-down state interventions and the law has
fuelled a tendency to equate civil society with non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
and often human rights NGOs, and to focus on the role of NGOs in supporting official
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transitional justice mechanisms. The work of NGOs tends to be understood as specialised
or sector-based, such as technical input into legal drafting processes or providing psycho-
logical support to victims. Commentators use official mechanisms as the main point of
reference, with civil society essentially mimicking or gap-filling, or acting as an intermedi-
ary between institutional mechanisms and citizens.
Recent critiques of the four-pillar approach focus on broadening conceptions of transi-
tional justice, localising transitional justice, and embedding transitional justice in country
or regional case studies.2However, the authors of this article argue that the extent to which
these studies go beyond a narrow institutional focus and set of normative prescriptions is
uneven, and none of them sets out a clear conceptualisation of the full range of roles civil
society can play in shaping transitional justice. In this article, we provide such a concep-
tualisation, and assert that to reconceptualise civil society in this way requires a shift from
transitional justice, in which both the nature of transition and the forms justice takes are
preconceived, to a focus instead on justice in transition, where both justice and transition
are dynamic, diverse and contextual.
In contrast to the narrow legalism of the justice of transitional justice, which is defined in
terms of a relationship with the state, individual accountability, and as delivered through
institutional mechanisms and approaches, justice in transition is defined more broadly. It
is understood not exclusively as it relates to acts of violence that preceded transition, but
also in terms of continuities of injustice. Justice in transition is ‘a broad social project and
a condition in society’, and understood as an everyday verb, given meaning and made/
remade in the everyday lives of people living in societies emerging from conflict.3 As
such, it is a plural rather than a singular concept, continually in the process of being con-
structed, and anchored in processes, perceptions and experiences rather than a set of objec-
tive, predetermined outcomes. Justice in transition seeks to understand how individuals and
communities engage with needs, rights, custom, community, agency and mobilisation, and
how they contest continuities of injustice and seek justice in their local environment and
with regard to the state. Justice in transition emerges from a particular time and place
and in contrast to transitional justice cannot be prescriptively described, but is the
product of a highly-contextualised approach to a justice deficit.
This article is conceptual and polemical. It seeks to shift, or open up, the terms of the
debate about transitional justice and civil society. It aims to outline a range of modalities
for civil society’s interaction with transitional justice (persuasion/advocacy, support,
mobilisation/capacity building/education, substitution/independent action, and as provid-
ing space for modelling alternatives), and explore how the activities of traditional civil
society, social movements and new civil society relate to these modalities. Its central argu-
ment is that while ‘old’ civil society privileges advocacy, support and capacity building,
with the state and state institutions as the main point of reference, new civil society cham-
pions autonomy, independent action and the modelling of alternatives, often choosing not
to see the state as a principal reference. The article draws on case study material from a
range of contexts to illuminate the conceptual argument. It starts by defining key terms
and examining the ways in which civil society actors can engage with transitional
justice, setting out a range of modalities of interaction. It analyses the existing literature
on old civil society and transitional justice using this framework and then sets out fresh
insights into civil society provided by literature on social movements and new civil
society, before concluding by exploring the relevance of this literature for transitional
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justice practice and scholarship. The flowering of novel forms of social action, using inno-
vative organisational modalities and forms of collective action, has created laboratories in
which to model alternatives. They offer potentially new avenues to address histories of
rights violations and the potential to re-imagine transitional justice as justice in transition.
Civil society, social movements and ‘new’ civil society
At the outset, three overlapping terms need to be defined: civil society, social movements
and ‘new’ civil society. Civil society is here defined as being constituted from:
All public spheres, separate from the apparatus of the state and the economic market, which
serve as locations of political participation and discursive interaction. It is a site of political
and social action and contestation, characterised by a diverse range of actors with different,
sometimes competing, agendas and repertoires of action.4
Civil society includes, but goes beyond, a set of organisations and institutions and ‘spaces’
of social relations which mediate between the individual and the state. Civil society also
transcends values of civility and notions of a single, inclusive public sphere. This deﬁnition
includes the liberal public sphere traditionally associated with NGOs, but also other, non-
liberal public spheres, such as those constituted by a range of ‘counterpublics’ which
actively contest mainstream social, political and transitional paradigms, and which
model alternatives.5 We do not assume that civil society actors are ideologically liberal,
legal or democratic: civil society can be uncivil, and transitional contexts are invariably
plural and unequal rather than ideal-type public spheres.
Social movements have driven democratisation in various parts of the world and can
reasonably be credited as integral to the creation of the contemporary discourse of transi-
tional justice, most notably through victims’ movements such as the Madres de Plaza de
Mayo in Argentina and the Khulumani Support Group in South Africa. Yet they remain
on the margins of transitional justice scholarship and discourse. Social movements are
‘collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained inter-
actions with elites, opponents and authorities’6 through which it is argued the margina-
lised or otherwise disenfranchised can challenge the dynamics of power in society.
Social movements’ greatest divergence from NGOs is through the role played by collec-
tive identity: social movements become not just a place to share identity but a source of it.
This gives social movements the potential to create as well as mobilise constituencies
and reveals social movements as potential tools of personal transformation through
conscientisation. The identities forged in such movements can be progressive, regressive
or both – for example, the victim identity in transitional justice often supports a
narrow ethnic, religious or ideological politics, reflecting the basis on which victimhood
occurred, as well as a politics of marginality, driven by the poverty that victimhood accent-
uates. The repertoires of action of social movements are often defined by contentious poli-
tics, the use of disruptive techniques – including various forms of protest – focussing on
rallies, public meetings, occupations, strikes and demonstrations.7 However, these remain
highly culturally and contextually dependent.
The term ‘new’ civil society refers to the ‘new’ forms of civil society associated with
recent events such as the Arab Spring and austerity-led protests in Southern Europe,
many of which explicitly reject mainstream NGOs and their ways of working.
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This term attempts to capture the claim that contemporary activism, including transitional
activism, is ‘evolving southward’, meaning that it is the Global South and its activisms that
provide us with privileged insights into ‘world-historical processes’ and as such ‘prefigure
the future’.8 For example, economic restructuring (or structural adjustment), and resist-
ance to it, are moving centre-stage in contemporary transitions and provide one illus-
tration of ways in which the Global North is learning from histories of struggle in the
south. In this context, Comaroff and Comaroff argue that:
social action centers on what Arendt… termed ‘the condition of life itself’ … Like similarly
assertive movements elsewhere, from Cochabamba to Mumbai, Chiapas to Cairo, the South
African versions seek to secure what are glossed as ‘services’ – the minima of a ‘dignified’
existence: clean water, housing, sanitation, medical care, basic income. Drawing on a
diverse global archive, from Marx, Gandhi, and Fanon, through the Book of Revelations
to the Zapatistas, to born-again faiths and human rights crusades, these forms of social
action are enabled by novel, liberalized social media. Often setting out explicitly to
develop a critical consciousness, they tend to foster new forms of mobilization… they also
decry the limited horizons of procedural democracy and politics-as-usual.9
In this context, new civil society is both old and ‘new’. For example, it integrates but also
modiﬁes many of the ﬂuid, less-hierarchical organisational modes and repertoires of
action of social movements. Both new civil society and social movements can offer a pre-
ﬁgurative politics, embodying within the ongoing political practice of a movement those
forms of social relations, decision-making, culture and human experience that are its ulti-
mate goal. As such, this creates spaces to re-imagine and model alternative approaches for
rights and justice in transition.10 We use the term new because the forms and agendas of
civil society being discussed suggest that the shifts associated with a populist, post-truth
era in politics are also affecting civil society – with an emergent, unpredictable and
more diverse sector developing, which is hostile to both mainstream formal politics and
mainstream civil society, including NGOs and social movements.11 We deﬁne new civil
society in terms of the plural nature of the ‘justice’ it seeks to advance, its return to the
economic as its priority consideration (as opposed to civil-political rights or identity poli-
tics), the way such actors organise and mobilise, and the repertoires of action they adopt,
for example, many such actors use explicitly ‘unruly’ tactics.
A framework of civil society interaction with transitional justice
This article will address the relationships between civil society and transitional justice in
terms of a framework outlining different types of interaction. Approaches that limit their
understanding of civil society to (human rights) NGOs typically envisage such interaction
as based largely on an externally codified normative framework, and rooted in an engage-
ment with the state as duty-bearer. This is predicated on an understanding that con-
ceptions of rights and justice are defined at global or national levels, and are normally
guaranteed by the state. In this article we draw on a modest existing literature, to argue
in contrast that social movements and new civil society play an active role in constructing
contextualised visions of justice and rights, and constructing the means through which
both can be claimed.12
Table 1 sets out the framework, and conceptualises transitional justice as both a dis-
course and a set of political processes within society, rather than simply a set of state-
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led mechanisms. Whilst many of these modes of action explicitly involve a relationship
with the state, others do not. Civil society actors can take action where no formal mech-
anisms exist, lead efforts to set up such mechanisms, as well as provide a space where citi-
zens can engage with the ideas and possibilities of transitional justice. These modes are not
mutually exclusive and many organisations will have used several modes, often changing
mode in response to the evolution of the transitional justice process or the political
environment, or indeed the organisation itself. Moving through the categories in
Table 1 can be understood as a shift between overlapping sets of understandings and
expectations: from transitional justice as a set of official institutions to transitional
justice as political processes, and from civil society in the service of institutions to civil
society as a more independent actor, and from a narrowly configured transitional
justice to a more broadly defined justice in transition.
This framework will be used to discuss how traditional civil society has interacted with
transitional justice and how social movements and new civil society can challenge and
transform that engagement.
Old civil society and transitional justice
Various themes relating to civil society emerge within the transitional justice literature: the
flux and uncertainty of transition; new opportunities alongside new threats; instrumental-
ist readings, interrogating the ‘use’ of civil society in relation to broader political and insti-
tutional agendas; weaknesses within civil society; and a tendency to collapse civil society
into a treatment of formal structures, and in particular NGOs.13
Table 1. Modes of civil society interaction with transitional justice mechanisms.
Persuasion/advocacy Work to influence formal transitional justice process, either directly or indirectly. This
includes calling for or resistance towards a process, and a range of different
repertoires of action such as documentation, lobbying and protest.
Support Offer technical, logistical, financial or other support to formal processes, such as
supporting a truth commission to access victims, using networks in the community.
Support can include follow up and extending the work of institutions, such as
advocating for the implementation of truth commission recommendations.
Mobilisation/capacity building/
education
Work with concerned constituencies so that they can engage with formal processes and/
or to empower them to represent themselves in independent initiatives, such as
victims’ groups. This can include classic rights-based approaches of educating
stakeholders about their rights, but extends to empowerment through the creation of
organisational forms that permit self-representation.
Substitution/independent
action
Undertake transitional justice style processes independently, such as grass-roots truth-
telling or documentation, or the provision of assistance to victims. Whilst this can feed
into a formal process at some point, it may not.
Space for modelling
alternatives
Organisations can test new forms of organisation and create spaces where alternatives
can be modelled:
. Generating their own understandings of rights and justice, and potentially rejecting
dominant discourses as a point of reference such as neoliberalism or even
transitional justice itself.
. Creating ‘zones of civility’ where reconciliation or truth-telling can occur, e.g.
religious or restorative justice interventions which contest the dominant discourse
on accountability.
. Implementing forms of collective action to both construct and modify collective
identity.
. Engaging in novel repertoires of action, including ‘unruly’ strategies that provide
alternatives to transitional justice mechanisms.
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Within transitional justice literature various typologies for civil society interactions
with transitional justice mechanisms emerge. Five typologies are discussed below: com-
parative advantage; task allocation; mechanism-specific; evidence-based; and transna-
tional advocacy. These are largely instrumental understandings of the role of civil
society (often understood as NGOs), which fit into the first three modalities of interaction
set out in Table 1 (advocacy/persuasion, support, and mobilisation/education). Underpin-
ning these instrumental readings is the argument that the existence and success of transi-
tional justice mechanisms is dependent on the strength of civil society, and on positive
interactions between civil society and state institutions:
Civil society has played an important role in every country that has experienced a successful
transitional justice endeavour. National NGOs have helped to initiate, advocate for, and
shape some of the strongest and most interesting transitional justice initiatives that have
been implemented around the world. In Ghana, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Peru, for
example, national or local organizations played central roles in giving shape to the justice
mechanisms put in place to confront past crimes.14
The ﬁrst civil society-transitional justice typology is comparative advantage, a discourse
that comes from development, and suggests that civil society organisations are better at
performing certain roles than the state, particularly where the state is weak. They can,
for example, ﬁll gaps resulting from incapacity and inequity of provision, respond more
ﬂexibly and efﬁciently than bureaucratic structures to opportunities, and facilitate legiti-
macy, participation and sustainability in local contexts.15
The second typology of task allocation maps the comparative advantage of civil society
organisations onto the specific modalities of transitional justice. Backer identifies seven
primary roles for civil society: data collection and monitoring; representation and advo-
cacy; collaboration, facilitation and consultation; service delivery and intervention;
acknowledgement and compensation; parallel or substitute authority; and research and
education.16 So civil society may feed archives of data into official truth projects or pro-
secutions, lead the lobbying for reparations, or provide psycho-social and other support
services to victims. Further, it is argued that civil society can facilitate inclusive dialogue,17
and through moral or value-based arguments contest decisions driven by political or par-
tisan convenience, for example, self-interested amnesty provisions, as part of a watchdog
or monitoring function.
The third typology looks at mechanism-specific roles for civil society. The literature
here often takes the form of toolkits produced by NGOs or inter-governmental agencies,
for example, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (OHCHR) Rule-of-
Law Tools for Post-Conflict States. Whilst these have the advantage of specificity, they are
subject to three tyrannies: instrumentalism, a narrow focus on NGOs, and uncritical calls
for consultation and participation, especially engagement with victims, as the route to
legitimacy and local ownership.18 Guides for interaction with truth commissions for
example contain detailed advice for civil society, including around modalities of inter-
action (consultation, advocacy, technical assistance, outreach, training), and more specific
tasks where a contribution can be made (drafting legislation, selection of commissioners,
statement taking, support for victims, championing recommendations).19 A key weakness
in all of these documents is the absence of any kind of theory relating to consultation and
participation.20
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A fourth typology is evidence-based, starting not from an idealised or normative
assumption of civil society’s role with regard to transitional justice but from evidence of
what occurs in reality. An impact assessment of NGOs and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) in South Africa, for example, argued that different NGO sectors had
different levels of input at different stages of the process.21 Input into the draft legislation
and conceptualising of the TRC excluded community-based organisations due to the
‘urgency, technical complexity and resource requirements’ of the tasks.22 During the
tenure of the TRC, activity was often driven by independent NGO initiatives rather
than joint NGO-TRC projects, and some tension arose due to the multiple roles of
NGOs (critic, supporter, watchdog, partner). While there were NGO successes – contest-
ing the initial decision to hold amnesty hearings behind closed doors, lobbying for a
change in approach to gender – most NGOs found it easier to engage with the lobbying
process to set up the TRC than with the TRC as an active institution. Further, looking to
the health of civil society in the post-transitional justice era, the TRC did not engage ‘suffi-
ciently or bolster directly the organs of civil society which are to carry on the more long-
term work of rebuilding society’.23
The fifth typology, transnational advocacy, looks at civil society in a transnational
setting. Scholarship emphasises advocacy work and patterns of norm diffusion, with a
range of models24 underpinned by insider-outsider coalitions, and the understanding
that local actors, normally NGOs, when faced with a hostile or unresponsive state, look
outwards to supportive NGOs, states, inter-governmental agencies and other actors to
put pressure on recalcitrant states. The ‘justice cascade’25 posits that accountability for
past human rights abuses is spreading through the increased use of trials and truth com-
missions. Among the criticisms of transnational advocacy are that it focuses mainly on
civil-political rights (rather than socio-economic rights), privileges elite advocacy, external
allies and norms (rather than mass mobilisation, internal solidarity and politics), adopts a
predominantly top-down theory of change (the use of the term ‘cascade’ is telling), and
overlooks both the fact that norm diffusion is profoundly uneven, and the reasons for it.26
Our main criticism of these typologies is that they conceive of civil society-transitional
justice interactions through the prism of institutional mechanisms rather than seeing tran-
sitional justice as a set of discourses and form of politics. As such, civil society plays little
role in independent action, advancing contextualised understandings of justice, or in
creating spaces in which alternatives can be modelled. This is what we understand as
justice in transition. Further, there is scant discussion of the modes of interaction specifi-
cally designed to empower civil society beyond transitional justice.27What emerges clearly
from the discussion above is that rethinking the relationship between civil society and
transitional justice will require new insights into modes of organisation, repertoires of
action, understandings of politics, rights and justice, and transnational approaches.
These four dimensions of civil society are used to structure the sections which follow
on social movements and new civil society, and to frame the search for alternatives.
Social movements in transitional justice: potential and threats
Social movements can drive new agendas, as they did in the transitions of the 1970s and
1980s, broadening perspectives from a focus on electoral democracy to include everyday
issues such as land rights, indigenous exclusion and poverty and inequality.28 Social
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movements have typically mobilised the indigenous, the rural poor and a range of actors
that are marginal to both governance generally and transitional justice in particular. Such
approaches can inform transitional justice by challenging institutional mechanisms
steered by elites with local approaches and broader consultation, and can catalyse
broader human rights movements and agendas.29
At an organisational level such movements can challenge the hierarchical and insti-
tutional approaches of transitional justice mechanisms through radical democratic prac-
tice, or participatory processes that go beyond representation. Social movements are
able to utilise all the repertoires of action outlined above (Table 1). Two repertoires are
central to their promise: confrontation and the ability to provide critical perspectives
and create alternative social spaces. Favouring confrontational approaches arises naturally
from their basis in contentious politics and repertoires such as protest, unlawful actions
and potentially violence, often considered unavailable to NGOs. During Kenya’s Truth,
Justice and Reconciliation Commission process, whilst human rights NGOs sought to
boycott the commission, victims’ groups actively sought to prevent statement takers
from working in communities they represented.30 As such, social movement type organ-
isations can both lead the development of more confrontational tactics in transition, while
potentially radicalising a range of constituencies. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo famously
used a public space in Buenos Aires to remember their children disappeared by the Argen-
tinian junta. The mothers’ weekly marches sought to advance formal justice and challenge
cultures of silence, emphasising the importance of performativity to social movement col-
lective action, using vocabularies of emotion rather than those of law. It was a mobilisation
that drove a nascent transitional justice practice, including ultimately leading to one of the
earliest truth commissions, centred on determining the truth about the disappeared.
However, the movement later splintered into factions, divided between a commitment
to the revolutionary politics of the disappeared and the seeking of truth and justice
about them within the current dispensation, demonstrating that identity-based move-
ments are challenged when the basis of that identity becomes more multifaceted.31
The alternative social and normative spaces created by social movements can serve to
address legacies of conflict, substituting for formal transitional justice mechanisms. These
can range from the creation of ‘zones of civility’32 where reconciliation between previously
antagonistic parties can begin, to building solidarities between survivors that overcome
and replace potentially antagonistic identities of the conflict.33 Social movements, includ-
ing those rooted in religious or other non-human-rights frameworks, can use alternative
grammars of transition that challenge the hegemonic discourse of accountability with
agendas of forgiveness/reconciliation or even revenge.34 Collective action targeting pre-
sumed perpetrators is an ‘active’ coping strategy that also creates networks of social and
psychological support that can transform experiences of victimhood.35 Similarly, collective
actions around the social practice of memory, often beginning with local initiatives to
remember and memorialise violations, have become national social movements to
counter official amnesia in both Latin America and Spain.36
A potential threat from the forms of organisation of social movements is that they will
serve not to dilute conflict-era identities, but reinforce polarised and exclusive understand-
ings of guilt and innocence and the idea of the ‘other’. The enhancing of victim agency
potentially holds the transition hostage to the least flexible agendas, infused with compe-
tition over limited political and economic resources. While both social movements and
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new civil society offer the possibility of non-liberal foundations for imagining justice,
among the risks for movements that are not rooted in human rights is that they
embody discriminatory practices that perpetuate domination, reflecting as well as challen-
ging existing hierarchies. A further risk is that while local understandings rooted in every-
day needs can be hugely important for justice in transition, there is the danger that highly
local perspectives are condemned to remain local, particularly where a proliferation of
agendas dilutes their focus. Universalising discourses, such as human rights, permit the
translation of particular issues into a generally accessible framework, with national and
international routes to action.
Victims’ groups are a potential bridge between old civil society, social movements and
new civil society, because they represent a mobilisation of those affected by violations, able
to act locally and use a range of repertoires of action, but also engage with a formal transi-
tional justice process and NGOs. As such they embody some of the organisational forms
and repertoires of action of social movements and new civil society, but are equally capable
of working at a national level in similar ways to human rights NGOs. In many cases,
however, their perspective on such institutional mechanisms will be informed by their
roots in victim communities and will be more critical of the scope and constraints of
such mechanisms than rights NGOs, or may become critical of these mechanisms and
NGOs over time, for example, the Khulumani Support Group in South Africa.37
In general, however, victims’ movements have had little impact on transitional justice
practice, despite their relevance to a discourse that increasingly claims to be ‘victim-
centred’. That victims have been unable to create strong and sustained social movements
in transitional settings reflects the limitations of victimhood as a principal identity around
which to mobilise, most notably since victims are constructed by transitional justice as
those who have been subject to acts of violence. Social movement theory understands
resource mobilisation and political opportunity as key drivers of effective mobilisation.
Victims are usually disempowered and often resource poor, technically, financially and
socially. Within transitional justice, it is victimhood, and a particular narrow conception
of victimhood, which provides the doorway to economic resources and political opportu-
nity. In many settings this plays into and even exacerbates a competitive politics of div-
ision. Understanding victimhood more broadly, using the lens of justice in transition,
could create movements with a capacity to see beyond narrow, historically divisive iden-
tities, and both mobilise greater numbers around social and economic issues and create
alliances with other marginalised constituencies.
Social movements extend understandings of terms such as politics, justice and rights
beyond civil-political rights and the law, and expand discourses beyond human rights
to frameworks rooted in understandings such as religious faith or politics beyond liberal-
ism. This can include reconceptualising from below the foundations on which transitional
justice is based, and can repoliticise understandings of transition in which a formalistic
legalism can obscure the power relations that permeate a given context. Social movements,
as an actor-oriented approach,38 have both reinterpreted and transformed the universalist
discourse of rights in the light of highly particular circumstances, and driven claims-
making that has origins in complementary or even contradictory understandings of the
world.
Transnational social movements have arisen in the face of globalisation driven by neo-
liberal economics, advancing collective action that allows such movements to both contest
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global governance and conceive a global alternative to existing political and economic
structures and approaches. Transitional justice and human rights have been disseminated
as an integral part of a set of top-down processes of globalisation, and social movements in
the ‘third world’ provide a site of resistance to international law as the locus of global
power and to NGOs as local vectors of it. Networked social movements have allowed
for the cross-national diffusion of protest in terms of repertoires of action and ideology.
This is perhaps most obviously represented by the uprisings of the Arab Spring, where
transition was driven by regional example.
The promise of social movements to transitional justice is analogous to what their col-
lective action has brought to democratisation, as a political process and in theory, in chal-
lenging narrow elite-led processes with mobilisation around a politics of the everyday. The
identity-driven networks of social movements provide a laboratory for the modelling and
dissemination of alternatives to current practice. The critical perspectives forged in such
collective action are informed by a range of ideologies and priorities that privilege
issues of greatest relevance to the concerned population, with complex relationships to
the human rights framework (critique, adaptation, replacement). As such, they have the
potential to provide a locally informed, broad-based and more democratic justice in tran-
sition, as an alternative to the institutional and often remote processes that have come to
define contemporary transitional justice.
The emergence of new civil society
This section draws on a number of studies which analyse the shifting composition and
agendas of contemporary civil society, and their impact on civil society-state relations,
in an era of populist, post-truth politics. All of the studies canvas international collabor-
ations and experiences to shed light on ‘subterranean politics’,39 ‘unruly politics’40 and
‘civil society @ crossroads’.41 What we term new civil society clearly shares a number of
similarities with social movements, but where it diverges we also note important
differences.
‘Subterranean politics’ seeks to capture a series of social mobilisations and collective
actions ‘bubbling up’ throughout Europe, which ‘resonate’ and ‘strike a chord’ with the
mainstream public and lead to that which is not normally visible in the mainstream
becoming visible through ‘public displays’. Such politics is ‘hopeful and dangerous’ as it
includes ‘xenophobic and populist movements as well as more emancipatory tendencies’42
– to capture this terrain, the definition includes some political parties, for example, Pirate
Parties, in various European countries as well as populist parties of the left and right.
‘Unruly politics’ is a more radical concept:
it is an approach that looks at politics beyond what has conventionally been defined as ‘poli-
tics’, institutionally and formally. It is simultaneously the insistence of new languages of poli-
tics, the redefinition of spaces of politics, ruptures in the aesthetic regimes of power, and the
creation of imaginaries of power beyond what is already intelligible.43
As such, the approach rejects the languages, acts and spaces that are used to ofﬁcially
deﬁne and sanction what is political. Unruly politics rejects the language of ofﬁcial
power and purely formal registers for becoming visible and making claims (such as the
juridical); carries out forms of action that are transgressive (illegal, violent, disruptive);
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and claims new spaces for political action and as political (streets and squares, virtual plat-
forms).44 The approach moves beyond an assumption that politics is about interests and
representation to focus on citizen action and expressions of agency. Unruly politics res-
onates with Sitrin’s writings on horizontalism and autonomy in Argentina in the after-
math of the economic collapse of 2001.45 The movements Sitrin writes about in
Argentina reject the contentious politics of more conventional social movements, in
that they do not predominantly challenge or reference the state or other authoritative
powers, or seek to take state power, but rather attempt to organise themselves outside
of these traditional forms of hierarchical and institutional power, and create alternative
powers.46 For our purposes, an evocative possibility emerges from this analysis: the possi-
bility of a transitional justice that is unruly and transgressive, highlights and supports
agency, captures the public imagination, and refuses to take ofﬁcial mechanisms as the
main point of reference for imagining possibilities.
To answer the question as to why these forms of activism and lines of inquiry have
emerged now it is necessary to look at the already-mentioned connections between politi-
cal and economic crises, and North and South. For example, the need to challenge the con-
centration of wealth and power within and across societies is a common concern.47 Two
further responses to the question ‘why now?’ are outlined in the new civil society literature.
First, we are living in an era of multiple disconnects – ordinary people feel disconnected
from formal politics and from traditional civil society vehicles, such as NGOs.48 For
example, new civil society actors differ from NGOs in their rejection of a narrow
results-based orientation, hierarchical decision-making, and de-politicising professionali-
sation – and, in contrast, express ‘alternative values of inclusion, participation and
innovation’.49
The second response to the ‘why now?’ question relates to the redundancy of existing
methods and concepts (including ‘disciplinary silos’ and sites where politics was assumed
to happen: ‘political parties’, ‘civil society’, ‘NGOs’ and ‘social movements’). The revolts of
2011, like those of 1989, were not anticipated or predicted because analysts and commen-
tators were asking the wrong questions and looking in the wrong places.50 Methodologies
need to privilege ‘studying by listening’, and the building of understanding and theory
from below, rather than the imposition of pre-existing theories from above.51 In short,
the gap between methods and reality represents another disconnect, as mainstream
methods enable us to ‘see like states’, ‘see like NGOs’, and ‘see like elites’, but not to
‘see like citizens’.52
New civil society in theory
With reference to modes of organisation, a starting point is that in recent transitions and
revolts traditional civil society actors have not played a central role in leadership or devel-
oping ‘new civic practices’. Movements that promote and shape transitions are increas-
ingly moving away from ‘traditional, representative, recognised forms of citizen
organisation to citizen-led, anti-hierarchical, horizontal networks’.53 Sitrin places horizon-
talidad/horizontalism at the heart of her definition of new movements in Argentina:
‘a form of direct decision making that rejects hierarchy and works as an ongoing
process’. In short, ‘[t]here is no rigid structure except that all participate, and over time
participate increasingly; through participation we find new modes of participation’.54
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Kaldor and Selchow use the metaphor of ‘swarm intelligence’ to capture a form of
organisation characterised by collective action, horizontality, replaceability and leaderless-
ness.55 Such modalities have often been used in the occupation of squares and public
spaces. A further characteristic of these organisational forms, is that unlike NGOs and
social movements which tend to have fairly homogenous memberships and clear leader-
ship structures, new civil society formations are diverse, fluid and ultimately challenge
formal concepts like ‘organisation’ and ‘leadership’. Leadership, where it exists, has
often come from the young and the middle classes, not the ‘angriest poorest of the
poor’.56 The danger of organisationless and leaderless organisation is that it is fleetingly
glorious but ultimately ephemeral. Tandon suggests that hybrid organisational forms
may be a way of addressing the challenge of sustainability.57 Better understanding of exist-
ing collaborations between old and new civil society is also needed.
Challenges to traditional approaches to organisation are echoed in challenges to tra-
ditional repertoires of action. Writing about protests in Greece, Pantazidou refers to
this as a change to a less predictable repertoire of protest: ‘Citizens started rejecting old,
representative and professionalised tactics for organising and progressively engaged
with a political culture of unmediated presence via direct democracy practices in assem-
blies and through social media’.58 Pantazidou provides a four-fold typology of action (soli-
darity, direct democracy, unruly action, and autonomy).59 First, solidarity structures
collectively address current problems. ‘Alternative currency’ networks and ‘exchange
economies’ allow people to exchange goods and services, ‘redefining the meaning of prop-
erty and sharing, belonging and community’, and contesting the social provision and
charity models of government and NGOs. Neighbourhood assemblies were the main
means of operationalising direct democracy at a local level. Assemblies operate as ‘self-
governed communities’, making ‘their own rules and processes which are always open
to review and change’.60 Unruly action has already been described above (disruptive, ille-
gitimate, illegal): citizens occupy tills at hospitals so that patients can be seen without cost,
or reconnect electricity in houses where provision has been cut. Direct, unruly action pro-
vides new ways to demand accountability, challenge injustice, and seek policy change.
Finally, autonomy means self-governance and solidarity under self-selected rules and pro-
cesses, and ‘self-organised and self-governed practices of production, consumption, and
work’ in an effort to create autonomous, alternative practices in the political, social and
economic spheres.61 In sum, these actions include both forms of resistance to prevailing
practices and policies and attempts to articulate alternatives.
Three repertoires of action merit further discussion. The first is the occupation of the
streets and city squares, and more generally the reclamation of public space, inspired by
the Arab Spring and later adopted in Europe. Such occupations served as ‘time- and
space-bound moral economies’, and recast public space as political space.62 In such
moral economies, all of the four typologies of action outlined by Pantazidou are made
manifest, and the ‘global street’ can become ‘a space where new forms of the social and
political can be made, rather than a space for enacting ritualized routines’.63 Second,
social media – the internet, Facebook and Twitter – have played an important role in
organising and mobilising collective action. Kaldor and Selchow talk of the way in
which the ‘ethos of web 2.0’ blurs distinctions between authors and readers, allowing col-
lective production and reproduction and a ‘2.0 culture of collectivity, openness and
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inclusion’.64 Third, recent protests have been highly performative, drawing on the arts to
communicate and engage.
The implications of this analysis for understandings of politics, justice and rights are
profound. All three are re-imagined with a greater focus on economics, poverty and
inequality. With reference to politics, recent protests are an exercise in the ‘collective
re-imagining of democracy’ through ‘prefigurative action’,65 modelling a more just
future. Central to the re-imagined democracy is the creation of physical and online
spaces which embody a greater emphasis on inclusive process, direct action and the mod-
elling of alternatives to mainstream politics and economics. Embracing alternative visions
is also key to new thinking on justice and rights. Justice, for example, is not just about law,
established rules and the state, but is primarily social – as citizens construct and enact their
own rules which may well, for example, challenge corrupt marriages of political and finan-
cial interests.66 Perhaps most importantly, visions of democracy, justice and rights emerge
through such processes and modelling exercises, as opposed to emerging through top-
down, state-led procedures.
Finally, the transnational dimension of new civil society is clear through ‘inter-textual
references’,67 and the ‘inscription’ of events in one place in uprisings elsewhere,68 commu-
nicating both inspiration and know-how via social media. For example, Barcelona’s Plaza
Catalunya was divided into three areas: ‘Tahrir’ for those concerned with democracy;
‘Iceland’ was the name of the economic zone; while ‘Palestine’ was for those concerned
with justice. In marches and squares a diversity of national flags flew. In the conceptual-
isation of the problem to be addressed – at both national and international levels the pol-
itical and economic systems were considered to be broken – and possible solutions (modes
of organisation, repertoires of action, understandings of politics, justice and rights), the
divide between North and South is blurred.
New civil society in practice
Consideration of new civil society in transitional justice practice confronts a dilemma. On
the one hand, an impact of the lens of transitional justice being so focussed on a particular
type of civil society actors is that where alternative or transgressive approaches have
emerged, these have often remained invisible. On the other hand, the sites associated
with the emergence of new civil society – the Arab Spring, southern Europe – do have
old and new transitional justice discourses that remain relatively untouched by the
ethos and practices of new civil society.69 However, whilst much of the discussion
above focuses on forms of politics that have not been directly linked to transitional
justice, a number of examples are relevant. In the examples below (Nepal, Argentina)
the links between new civil society and transitional justice emerge from the fusion of tran-
sitional justice with continuities of injustice, broad understandings of civil society, inde-
pendent action and the modelling of alternatives, and an embeddedness in local politics
and context.
In Nepal, a long tradition of protest combined with the perception that human rights
NGOs fail to frame issues of transitional justice in ways that resonate with populations
affected by violations, has led to a direct contestation of both the role and modalities of
traditional civil society. A movement of victims of violence of the conflict has articulated
an agenda of ‘resisting representation’ by NGOs and favoured forming their own
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organisations, in many cases organisations that have emerged and principally acted locally.
Their activities involve campaigning for a transitional justice process that addresses their
needs, and driven by an acknowledgement of the poverty and marginalisation of most
victims of violence, have taken the form of street protests and efforts to confront the auth-
orities. They have additionally focussed on commemoration activities at both local level
and in the capital, seeing these as simultaneously addressing a desire of victims for
public acknowledgment and confronting authorities with a demand for truth about the
past, particularly concerning those disappeared by the state.70
Ex-Maoist combatants in Nepal, who were excluded from the integration process due to
having been recruited as minors, have mobilised in Kathmandu and conducted a series of
‘unruly’ actions that reflect their past in a violent revolutionary movement and their ignor-
ance of rights discourse. Seeing the United Nations (UN) as complicit in their treatment,
an early action was to systematically vandalise UN vehicles. More recently, they have
locked the gates of the headquarters of the Maoist Party – now leading the government
– and faced mass arrests. Over the years since their activism began, the leadership of
the group has learnt the benefits of the use of rights language, and now, alongside
demands for financial compensation and vocational training, they are seeking the prose-
cution of those who recruited them as children. This tactic has aroused the interest of
donors and the international community, and the group now uses its traditional street
protest tactics while tactically talking in terms of human rights with audiences who
want to hear that language.71
In Argentina Sitrin places several transitional justice organisations – and specifically the
organisation of children of the disappeared from the era of military dictatorship, formed in
1995, HIJOS (Hijas y HIJOS por Identidad y Justicia y contra el Olvido y Silencio, Daugh-
ters and Sons for Identity and Justice and Against Silence and Forgetting) – at the heart of,
and as ‘paving the way for’, the movements that flourished after the economic and political
collapse in Argentina of 19 and 20 December 2001.72 In terms of modes of organisation,
two observations are important. First, HIJOS prefigured horizontalism by working ‘in
network formations, without hierarchy or central power structures’.73 Second, the organ-
isation made a direct connection between participatory decision making and the creation
of social agents and new subjectivities.74 The repertoires of action used by HIJOS included
escraches. Escraches are multidimensional street-based actions usually targeting a person’s
home, and serve as a ‘process of outing – a tactic for social awareness using direct action,
theatre and education against silence and forgetting’.75 In its actions, HIJOS is not directly
making demands of the state, but rather addressing society (neighbourhoods and commu-
nities), breaking the social silence around, and acceptance of, the fact that killers and tor-
turers live normal lives in society. While legal justice is one goal, justice claims also refer to
social justice ‘and making a situation equal or fair’.76 HIJOS has formed links with the
post-2001 movements, while the rupture caused by the 2001 economic and political col-
lapse has led to its activities receiving more public support. Illustrating the complex pro-
cesses of cross-referencing that occurs in contemporary protest, those who were the youth
of the 2001 rebellions have started to call themselves ‘the HIJOS of the 19th and 20th’.77
The regrouping of the state in Argentina under the Kirchner governments provides
some more cautionary lessons.78 A stronger set of human rights policies, and specifically
the overturning of amnesty laws and opening up of the possibility of prosecutions for mili-
tary-era abuses, has divided the human rights community. Organisations, including
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HIJOS, have been divided on whether to engage with the government’s human rights
policy and recent prosecutions, or to retain a position characterised by independence
and autonomy:
For HIJOS the challenge was how (and if) to participate in the trials without giving up on its
deep questioning of institutional justice; how to get what it could from the system without
compromising the bigger long-term goals of social transformation and the creation of new
social relationships.79
Challenges and possibilities of new civil society
To conclude, it is important to look at limitations of the new civil society concept and lit-
erature, and the implications of the concept for transitional justice. Two key limits dom-
inate. First, the uncivil elements of new civil society, including exclusive or discriminatory
understandings of politics, justice and rights, are under-represented in the discussion
above and may turn out to be more enduring and better organised than their more pro-
gressive counterparts. The value of human rights is that it can instil a progressive and
inclusive politics into campaigns for justice, while many of the competing frameworks
embody within them patriarchy and other discriminatory understandings. This will
always be a risk in seeking to challenge the primacy of the rights discourse in transition,
but this can itself be at least partially addressed by advancing the idea of agency – that all
agendas, and in particular those of the marginalised, should be heard. The ultimate goal is
a radical pluralism: in which the discourse of human rights is placed alongside other sig-
nificant progressive frameworks in both defining and advancing justice.
Second, it has to be acknowledged that the protest movements have not changed the
terms of the mainstream debate on systemic political and economic issues – invariably,
the powerful have regrouped, whether it be the financial tsars that pillage the global
economic system, or traditional political actors like the Muslim Brotherhood – and
more recently the military – in Egypt. It remains to be seen if a focus on process and
modelling micro-level alternatives will continue, if the expanded repertoire of political
action made possible and imagined will remain a point of reference, and whether
such activism will erupt again with sufficient scale and intensity to sustainably challenge
the status quo.
Despite these limitations, new civil society has the potential to assist in rethinking the
relationship between civil society and transitional justice, and inform reconceptualisations
of justice and transition as well as to drive the rethinking of meanings of justice and tran-
sition. In terms of the modalities of interaction set out at the start of the article in Table 1,
the emphasis shifts to substitution/independent action, creating spaces for modelling
alternatives, and forms of advocacy and mobilisation with a more critical edge. Due to dis-
connects between actors (the state/NGOs and citizens), as well as between policies/meth-
odologies and realities, it is clear that a subterranean, unruly, transgressive transitional
justice both already exists under the radar and could be supported and fostered if new
approaches were adopted – and that such a transitional justice would resonate with citi-
zens and publics in ways that formal transitional justice rarely does. Rather than a focus on
mechanisms, NGOs and established repertoires, new civil society modes of organisation
and repertoires of action break down divides between expert activists and citizens,
events and the everyday, law and justice, and process and outcomes. Championing the
modelling of alternatives and globalisation through citizen action would lead to a form
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of justice in transition which encompasses greater diversity, and local inflexion, in under-
standings of politics, justice and rights.
Conclusion
Based on the developments discussed above, this article makes three core arguments. First,
that rethinking civil society entails rethinking modes of organisation, repertories of action,
understandings of politics, rights and justice, and transnational approaches. Second,
rethinking civil society in this way, and moving away from a focus on institutions, top-
down state interventions, the law and NGOs, entails a broader discussion of justice in tran-
sition rather than narrower transitional justice framings. Third, underpinning both of
these developments is the fact that our understanding of civil society, and activism,
needs to ‘evolve southward’. While challenges remain – such as managing evolving
relationships with the state, and assessing what priority to give the state and its activities
– this approach would help to deliver a transitional justice that is more diverse, more
accessible, more vibrant and more locally relevant – in short, a transitional justice that
resembles what we term justice in transition. It would also place transitional justice
closer to the pulse of contemporary activism and protest.
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